Anti Trust - Personal Liability of Corporate Officers Participating in Sherman Act Violations by Auster, Paul
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 4 | Issue 2 Article 10
Anti Trust - Personal Liability of Corporate Officers
Participating in Sherman Act Violations
Paul Auster
Copyright c 1963 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Paul Auster, Anti Trust - Personal Liability of Corporate Officers Participating in Sherman Act Violations,
4 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 217 (1963), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss2/10
CASE COMMENTS
ANTI-TRUST
Personal Liability of Corporate Officers participating in Sherman
Act Violations.
In U. S. v. Wise,' the question of the personal liability of
a corporate officer, acting solely in his representative capacity,
under Section I of the Sherman Act,2 was litigated. The court,
in the instant case, following an earlier interpretation of the
word "person,"3 reversed the lower court's decision and
held that a corporate officer, acting solely in his representative
capacity, "is subject to prosecution under § 1 of the Sherman
Act whenever he knowingly participates in effecting the
illegal contract, combination, or conspiracy."4 The court
went on to say, ". . . insofar as Section 14 [of the Clayton
Acts5] relates to the corporate officer who participates in the
1 370 U.S. 405 (1962). This paper is concerned only -with the appeal of the
individual defendant, Wise. In a companion case, the indictment charged
that appellee, as corporate officer acting solely in his representative capacity,
had violated Section I of the Sherman Act by "engaging in a combination
to eliminate price competition . . . in unreasonable restraint of trade and
commerce . . ." Appellee pmoved that the charge against him be dismissed
because it failed to state a crime. According to appellee, the word "person"'
as used in Section I of the Sherman Act, applied only to corporate officers
acting solely in their individual capacities. The court distinguished between
representative capacity and individual capacity. One who is acting for his
own account is considered acting in his individual capacity, whereas, one
who is representing his company is acting in his representative capacity.
The appellee further alleged that due to the legislative intent of those who
enacted the Clayton Act, corporate officers acting solely in their repre-
sentative capacities, could be indicted only under Section 14 of that Act.
The District Court granted appellee's motion. U.S. v. National Dairy
Products Corp., 196 F.Supp. 155 (W.D. Mo. 1961), -reid 83 S.Ct. 594
(1963).
2 "lEvery person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy, declared by Sections 1-7 of this title to be illegal, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment
not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of
the court." 26 Star. 209 (1890), as amended 69 Star. 282 (1955), 15
U.S.C., Section 1 (1958).
a United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). Although the Dotter-
weich decision involved the interpretation of the word "person" in Section
301 of the Federal Food and Drug Act, 52 Stat. 1040, 21 U.S.C. 331(a)
(1958), the court reconciled the two: "No intent to exculpate a corporate
officer who violates the law is to be imputed to Congress without clear
compulsion." U.S. v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 409 (1962).
4 370 U.S. 405, 416 (1962).
5" . . [W]henxver a corporation shall violate any of the penal provisions of
the anti-trust laws, such violation shall be deemed to be also that of the
individual directors, officers, or agents of such corporation who shall have
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Sherman Act violation, whether or not in a representative
capacity, no change was either intended or effected." 6
Prior to the Wise decision, five district court cases 7 held
contra to it, while only two 8 were in accord. To settle this
conflict, the government appealed directly to the Supreme
Court. 9
Although it had been the policy of the government to
indict corporate officials under the Sherman Act, 1 o the question
of their capacity, at the time of the violation, was never brought
before the court until this late date. However, earlier cases,
though not confronted with the issue as presented in the
instant case, speak of it in settling the case before them, and
appear to be in accord with the Wise decision."
authorized, ordered, or done any of the acts constituting in whole or in
part such violation, and such violation shall be deemed a misdemeanor,
and upon conviction therefor of any such director, officer, or agent, he
shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding five thousand dollars or by
imprisonment for not exceeding one year, or by both, in the discretion of
the court." 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 24 (1958).
370 U.S. 405, 414 (1962).
7 United States v. A. P. Woodson Co., 198 F.Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1961);
United States v. American Optical Co., C.C.H. Trade Reg. Rep.'j 70, 156
(E.D. Wis. 1961); United States v. Milk Distributors Association, Inc.,
200 F.Supp. 792 (D.C. Md. 1961); United States v. General Motors
Corp., Crim. No. 30132 (S.D. Cal. 1962); and, United States v. Engel-
hard-Hanovia, Inc., 204 F.Supp. 407 (S.D. N.Y. 1962).
8 United States v. Northern American Van Lines, Inc., 202 F.Supp. 639
(D.D.C. 1962); United States v. Packard-Bell Electronics Corp., Crim.
No. 30158 (S.D. Cal. 1962). A motion to dismiss was denied without
opinion.
9 The government, in a criminal case, may appeal directly to the Supreme
Court where an indictment has been dismissed based upon the construc-
tion of statute, "upon which the indictment . . . is founded for] [f rom
a decision arresting a judgment of conviction for insufficiency of the
indictment." Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 62 Stat. 844 (1948),
63 Star. 97 (1949), 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1958).
1') United States v. Greenhut, 50 F. 469 (D.C.D. Mass. 1892); American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1945), affirmed,
328 U.S. 781 (1946).
11 See, for example, United States v. American Tobacco Co., 164 F. 700
(1908). The court said, "The statute [Sherman Act] declares unlawful
every combination in restraint of trade. It contains no words of limita-
tion or qualification, and the Supreme Court of the United States has
decided that the courts have no right to attach them to it." See, also,
Gulf Coasrt Shrimpers and Oysters Association v. United States, 236
F.2d 658, 662 (5th Cir. 1956); United States v. General Instruments
Corp., 115 F.Supp. 582, 587 (D.D.C. N.J. 1953); United States v.
Winslow, 195 F. 578, 581 (D.C.D. Mass. 1912); United States v. Mac-
Andrews and Forbes Co., 149 F. 823, 831 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1906).
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The importance of the Wise decision is evident when one
notes that the government has primarily used Sections I and
II of the Sherman Act to indict corporate officers. 12 In 1955,
Congress, presumably in light of this fact, amended Section I
of the Sherman Act and raised the fine for violating that
section from five to fifty thousand dollars.'1 The fine for
violating Section 14 of the Clayton Act remained at five
thousand dollars. ' 4
Had the court upheld appellee's contentions, the govern-
ment would have been limited to indicting corporate officers,
for all practical purposes, under Section 14 of the Clayton
Act, with its smaller fine. As a result, the 1955 amendment to
the Sherman Act would have been meaningless and the
government's overall enforcement of the anti-trust laws would
have been more difficult.
An interesting result of the Wise case, and probably a new
procedure for the indictment of corporate officers, may have
been illustrated in United States v. Engelhard-Hanovia, '5 where
the government charged corporate officials, acting solely in
their representative capacity, of violating both Section I of
the Sherman Act and Section 14 of the Clayton Act. The
precedent for this form of indictment appears to have been
established earlier,'(; but does not appear to have been used
again until two recent cases. '.7 The court dismissed count 1
of the charge as to the individual defendants, on the ground
that it did not believe that Congress intended to make those
individuals, acting in their executive capacity, liable under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. 18
12 U. S. v. Wise, 370"U.S. 405, 414 (1962).
1369 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
1438 Star. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1958).
15 204 F.Supp. 407, (D.C. S.D. N.Y. 1962).
10 Baran v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 256 F. 570 (D.C. S.D. N.Y. 1918).
17U. S. v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 415, 416, 417 (1962). (Since these are the
latest cases on this question, it appears that the government may be using
this form of indictment in the future.)
18 U. S. v. Engelhard-Hanovia, 204 F.Supp. 407, 409, 410 (D.C. S.D. N.Y.
1962).
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Based upon the Wise decision, Engelhard-Hanovia has been
reversed, 1 9 and it now appears that a corporate officer, acting
solely in his representative capacity, may be prosecuted for
violating both Section I of the Sherman Act and Section 14
of the Clayton Act. A maximum fine of fifty-five thousand
dollars and a two-year jail sentence would thus result. As was
said in an earlier decision, "The question for the courts,
however, is not economical, but wholly legal, to wit, the true
interpretation of the law as enacted by Congress."'2 0 When
viewed in this light, the courts will be giving full effect to the
intent of Congress as interpreted by the Wise decision. The
decision reached by the court in the Wise case is consistent
with the true legislative purpose of the Sherman Act.
Senator Sherman said: "I do not wish to single out any
particular trust or combination. It is not a particular trust,
but the system I aim at."21 By including the corporate
executive who acts in his representative capacity, the court
has allowed an integral part of the "system" to be included
in the scope of Section I of the Sherman Act. Its decision
supports a position taken by many of the courts in trying
previous anti-trust cases under the Sherman Act, 22 i. e., where
the intent to violate the Act is shown, the guilty party should
be prosecuted.
The government has not used the increased penalty, pro-
vided by the 1955 amendment to the Sherman Act, to its
IOU. S. v. Fred D. Brown, et al., 83 S.Ct. 22 (1963). The court only re-
jected appellee's contention that the Clayton Act is the sole means avail-
able for indicting a corporate officer, acting solely in his representative
capacity. It did not say corporate officers, acting solely in their repre-
sentative capacity, could not be indicted under § 14 of the Clayton Act.
Throughout its opinion, in the Wise decision, the court speaks of the
Clayton Act as supplementary, and not as a ". . . restriction of Section I
of the Sherman Act." 370 U.S. 405, 414 (1962).
20Paramount Pictures v. United Motion Pictures, T.O., 93 F.2d 714, 719
(3rd Cir. 1937).
21 21 Cong. Rec. 2457 (Remarks of Senator Sherman).
22 "Under the Sherman Act, a combination found for the purpose and with
the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing the price
of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se."
United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
See also, United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F.Supp. 545
(D.C. E.D. Penna. 1960); Patterson v. United States, 222 F. 599 (6th
Cir. 1915); Lawlor v. Loewe, 187 F. 522 (2nd Cir. 1911).
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maximum.2 3 The Wise case may serve as the impetus for the
government to prosecute corporate executives for the maximum
penalty provided by Section I of the Sherman Act and thus
help the anti-trust laws achieve their true goal of".., free
and unlimited competition."24
P.A.
23 The average fine for guilty pleas since 1955 is actually two thousand, three
hundred and thirty-seven dollars and twenty cents. Compiled from
CCH. The Federal Anti-Trust Laws (Supps. 1952-1956, 1957-1961) as
reported in Whiting Anti.Trust and the Corporate Executive, 40 VA.
L. REV. 1 (1962).
24 Thurmond Arnold, "A Reappraisal of the Anti-Trust Laws," Conference
on Freedom and the Law, 13 University of Chicago Conference Series
98 ( 1 95 8 ),p. 102.
